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THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE
Brian S. Haney†

INTRODUCTION
Most people think the fusion of man and technology might happen in the
distant future; the truth is that human beings are already cyborgs. With a smartphone,
a human being can quickly answer virtually any question, store limitless
information in memory, and complete any calculation.1 Modern technology
information
companies collect data about humans from smartphones and feed it directly through
advanced artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems.2 By design, AI systems maximize
electrical impulses to consumers’ limbic systems, the brain’s reward center, to
stimulate economic growth and development.3 At the National Governors
Association’s 2017 Summer Meeting, Elon Musk stated, “[t]he biggest risk that we
face as a civilization is artificial intelligence.”4
Musk is not alone; in fact, there is a growing list of scholars and industry
leaders that have directed attention to the existential threats that AI poses to man.5
Yet, legal scholarship on the topic of artificial intelligence has either denied or
relatively ignored the accelerating rate of AI advancement.6 Instead, current legal
scholarship devoted to AI regulation has encouraged regulators not to be distracted
by claims of an “AI apocalypse” and to focus their efforts on “more immediate
harms.”7 In sum, legal scholarship in the field of AI regulation is far behind and
provides misguided advice to regulators and scholars.8 Indeed, every task humans
use intelligence to perform is a target for AI automation.9 Further, it has often been
the case that once an AI system reaches human level performance at a given task,
shortly thereafter that same AI system exceeds the performance of the most skilled

† Brian S. Haney, J.D. Notre Dame Law School 2018, is the Chief Executive Officer of Martian Technologies. Special thanks go to LaDarien Harris, Mike Gallagher, Ryan Claudeanos, Delaney Foreman, Maria
Munoz-Robles, Brian Wongchaowart, Bill Green, Ned Rooney, and the Journal of Legislation.
1 The Joe Rogan Experience #1169 – Elon Musk, THE JOE ROGAN EXPERIENCE (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycPr5-27vSI.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Elon Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN, 50:00 (July 15,
2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-national-governors-association-2017-summermeeting.
5 See MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION 12 (2018); see also MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0 BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2017).
6 See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 432
(2017).
7 See id. at 431.
8 See id.
9 BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 5.
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humans in completing that task.10 Many AI researchers expect that AI systems will
eventually reach and then exceed human-level performance in all tasks.11
AI technology is sculpting a future where fake pictures and videos are
inexpensive, widely available, and indistinguishable from the real thing, which is
completely reshaping the way in which humans associate truth with evidence.12 Even
those who doubt whether Artificial General Intelligence (“AGI”), AI capable of
accomplishing any goal,13 will be created in the future, still agree that AI will have
profound implications for all domains, including: healthcare, law, and national
security.14 The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, this Article defines and
explains AI’s cutting-edge technology with a specific focus on deep reinforcement
learning, a breakthrough type of machine learning developed by Google in 2013.15
Second, this Article identifies three hurdles for regulators to overcome in regulating
AI.
This Article contributes to current legal and AI scholarship in three main
ways. It is the first to focus on deep reinforcement learning, specifically on the
existential threats posed by AI and it is the first to engage with the formal models
that underpin AI. This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains basic terms
and concepts in AI and explores several practical applications of AI in modern
industry. Part II explains deep reinforcement learning, a relatively recent
breakthrough in AI that many scholars believe provides a path to AGI. Part III
explores legal scholarship on the topic of AI regulation and discusses three issues
regulators must address to develop a strong regulatory framework for AI.
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Contemporary scholars have presented several different definitions of AI.
For example, MIT Professor Max Tegmark concisely defines AI as “non-biological
intelligence.”16 Google’s Ray Kurzweil has described AI as “the art of creating
machines that perform functions that require intelligence when performed by
people.”17 Additionally, according to Stanford Professor Nils Nilsson, AI is
“concerned with intelligent behavior in artifacts.”18 Generally, and for the purposes
of this Article, AI refers to the study and development of intelligent machines that
can replicate the thought processes of human cognitive functions like making
predictions, speech processes, or playing games.
While AI includes different categories, two types of AI are most important
in the context of AI regulation. The first is narrow AI, also known as weak AI.19
Narrow AI has the ability to accomplish a limited set of goals20 and is associated with
attempts to develop AI to improve human intelligence, as opposed to duplicating
10 Id. at 16.
11 Id.
12 GREG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 31 (2017).
13 TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 31 (2017).
14 ALLEN & CHAN, supra note 12.
15 Methods and Apparatus for Reinforcement Learning, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/097,862 (filed
Dec. 5, 2013) (available at https://patents.google.com/patent/US20150100530A1/en); see also TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 84.
16 TEGMARK, supra note 5.
17 RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 14 (1992).
18 NILS J. NILSSON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A NEW SYNTHESIS 1 (1998).
19 NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 388 (2010).
20 See TEGMARK, supra note 5.
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human intelligence.21 The second type of AI is artificial general intelligence
(“AGI”), also known as strong AI.22 To demonstrate AGI, an AI agent must have the
ability to accomplish any goal.23 AGI is associated with the claim that a programmed
computer could be a mind and could think at least as well as humans do.24 Ultimately,
AGI is the current goal for many AI researchers.25 For example, OpenAI, a nonprofit organization funding pioneering research in the field, states on its website that
its mission is “[d]iscovering and enacting the path to safe artificial general
intelligence.”26 Yet, it appears for the time being, that only narrow AI has been
developed and successfully deployed.27
A. AI IN MODERN PROFESSIONAL INDUSTRIES
The implementation of narrow AI is disrupting modern industries
worldwide.28 Even the legal industry is not exempt from this corrosive force.29
Indeed, technology assisted review (“TAR”) is revolutionizing the discovery process
and AI is at the forefront of this innovation.30 Litigators are now commonly called
on by clients to establish e-discovery relevancy hypotheses and to implement
predictive coding models (a type of TAR) for the discovery of electronic
information.31 In this process, litigators will first identify keywords to search and
identify an initial set of documents to be reviewed.32 Then, document review
attorneys review, code, and score the initial set of documents based on the occurrence
of certain keywords in relation to a document’s relevance.33 As this review takes
place, e-discovery attorneys train and model supervised learning algorithms to
classify documents based upon the document review attorneys’ decisions in
classifying documents in the initial set of documents.34 In other words, the algorithm
learns what documents are relevant by analyzing and replicating the decisions of real
attorneys.35 Additionally, predictive-coding models are capable of classifying
millions of discoverable documents based on relevance.36

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
(2003).
28

See NILSSON, supra note 19, at 388–89.
See NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 23 (2017).
TEGMARK, supra note 5.
NILSSON, supra note 19.
Id.
About OpenAI, OPENAI https://openai.com/about/ (last visited May 10, 2019).
See generally Nick Bostrom, Are You Living in A Computer Simulation?, 53 PHILOSOPHY Q. 211, 243

ALLEN & CHAN, supra note 12; see also HEMANT TANEJA, UNSCALED: HOW AI AND NEW GENERATION OF UPSTARTS ARE CREATING THE ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE 1 (2018).
29 RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 11 (2d ed. 2017).
30 Scott D. Cessar, Christopher R. Opalinski, & Brian E. Calla, Controlling Electronic Discovery Costs:
Cutting “Big Data” Down to Size, ECKERT SEAMANS (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.eckertseamans.com/publications/controlling-electronic-discovery-costs-cutting-big-data-down-to-size; see also Nicholas Barry, Man
Versus Machine Review: The Showdown Between Hordes of Discovery Lawyers and a Computer-Utilizing Predictive-Coding Technology, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 343, 344 (2013).
31 KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS 240–42 (2017).
32 Barry, supra note 30, at 351.
33 GORDON V. CORMACK & MAURA R. GROSSMAN, EVALUATION OF MACHINE-LEARNING PROTOCOLS
FOR TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED REVIEW IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 154 (2014), http://plg2.cs.uwaterloo.ca/~gvcormac/calstudy/study/sigir2014-cormackgrossman.pdf.
34 Barry, supra note 30, at 354.
35 Id.
36 See e.g. ASHLEY, supra note 31, at 250.
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A second example of an industry that is rapidly evolving due to AI is
healthcare.37 In another decade, the healthcare industry will look very different from
today due to AI.38 Currently, AI driven by big data is creating a noticeable shift in
the practice of medicine from mass-market to personalized care.39 Indeed, medical
professionals practicing in modern hospitals now store patient data in electronic
databases with Electronic Healthcare Records (“EHRs”).40 This allows machinelearning algorithms to analyze patient healthcare data and drastically improve patient
care.41 These data-driven resources not only allow a doctor to know virtually
everything about a patient’s medical history without ever meeting the patient, but
also drastically reduce costs associated with healthcare by assisting in medical
work.42 For example, in 2016, researchers at Stanford developed AI that was able to
diagnose lung cancer more accurately than human pathologists.43 Another example
is D-Wave’s Adiabatic Quantum Computer, which is capable of running machine
learning algorithms for cancer diagnostics.44 In short, EHRs, big data, and AI are
transforming the health-care landscape.45
A third example of AI disruption is occurring in the defense industry. AI is
already an essential tool in cybersecurity.46 Admiral Mike Rogers, Director of the
National Security Administration has argued that AI and machine learning are
foundational to the future of cyber security.47 On March 2, 2017, a report was issued
to the White House stating that Russian programmers launched an AI cyber-attack
on the personal social-media accounts of over 10,000 employees at the Department
of Defense.48 Additionally, AI is used on the battlefield in modern warfare settings.49
For example, the U.S. Phalanx missile-defense system for naval ships uses AI to
detect, track, and attack threats from enemy missiles and aircraft.50 However,
terrorist misuse of commercial AI systems is a serious problem.51 Terrorist
organizations are already using AI systems in drones to deliver explosives and cause
crashes.52
Narrow AI continues to change the way professional industries such as law,
healthcare, and defense operate.53 Several AI researchers have cited observable
37 TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 102.
38 TANEJA, supra note 28, at 73.
39 Id.
40 Kate Monica, Apple EHR Patient Data Viewer Now in Use at 39 Health Systems, EHRINTELLIGENCE
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://ehrintelligence.com/news/apple-ehr-patient-data-viewer-now-in-use-at-39-health-systems.
41 See XIAOQIAN JIANG ET AL., A PATIENT-DRIVEN ADAPTIVE PREDICATION TECHNIQUE TO IMPROVE
PERSONALIZED RISK ESTIMATION FOR CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT 137 (2012).
42 See Alvin Rajkomar et al., Scalable and Accurate Deep Learning with Electronic Health Records,
NATURE PARTNER J. (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-018-0029-1.pdf.
43 See Lloyd Minor, Crunching the Image Data Using Artificial Intelligence to Look at Biopsies, STANFORD MED. (2017), https://stanmed.stanford.edu/2017summer/artificial-intelligence-could-help-diagnose-cancer-predict-survival.html.
44 See Brian S. Haney, Quantum_Machine_Learning_Cancer_Diagnostics, GITHUB (Feb. 24, 2019),
https://github.com/Bhaney44/Leap/blob/master/Quantum_Machine_Learning_Cancer_Diagnostics.py.
45 Id.
46 See generally BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 5.
47 ALLEN & CHAN, supra note 12, at 18.
48 See Massimo Calbresi, Inside Russia’s Social Media War on America, TIME (May 18, 2017),
http://time.com/4783932/inside-russia-social-media-war-america/.
49 See United States Navy Fact File: MK 15 – Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), U.S. DEP’T
NAVY (last visited May 13, 2019), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2.
50 TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 111 (2017).
51 See generally BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 5.
52 See id.
53 See generally TEGMARK, supra note 5.
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patterns in historic information technology price and performance kinetics to
support the argument that the rate of advancement of AI technologies will happen
far more rapidly than expected.54 Moreover, these researchers hypothesize AI
technologies will continue to advance at an accelerating rate.55
B. THE LAW OF ACCELERATING RETURNS
The Law of Accelerating Returns (“LOAR”) states that fundamental
measures of information technology will generally follow a predictable and
exponential trajectory.56 Indeed, information technologies build upon themselves in
an exponential manner; this phenomenon has been named Moore’s Law and is readily
measurable in most processes where patterns of information evolve.57 It describes
the LOAR’s application to the price and performance of computing58 and was
proposed by Gordon Moore, the founder of Intel, in 1965.59 Moore’s Law predicts
that every eighteen months, the processing power of computers will double, while
costs are cut in half.60 It generally represents that the power of information
technology doubles every one and a half years.61 The past fifty-three years have
proven Gordon Moore’s prediction correct;62 a smartphone today has more
computing power than all of NASA had in 1969—when Apollo 11 landed on the
Moon.63 Applied to AI, Moore’s Law has led many AI researchers to believe that we
are currently at the cusp of developing super-intelligent AI.64
Irving J. Good first introduced the concept of superintelligence in 1965.65
Good stated, “[l]et an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far
surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever.”66 According to
Good, “[s]ince the design of machine is one of these intellectual activities, an
ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then
unquestionably be an intelligence explosion, and the intelligence of man would be
left far behind.”67 Indeed, Good predicted that the first ultraintelligent machine
would be “the last invention that man need ever make.”68 Recent scholars have
embraced Good’s analysis and have defined superintelligence similarly. For
example, Oxford Professor Nick Bostrom defines superintelligence as “any intellect
that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of
interest.”69 Max Tegmark states that superintelligence is “[g]eneral intelligence far
beyond human level.”70
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
note 5.
65

See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 85.
See RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND 250 (2012).
See id.
See id. at 256.
See MARTINE ROTHBLATT, VIRTUALLY HUMAN 48 (2014).
See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 251.
See SUSSKIND, supra note 29, at 11.
See ROTHBLATT, supra note 58, at 28.
See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 251.
See MICHIO KAKU, THE PHYSICS OF THE FUTURE 23 (2011).
See generally BOSTROM, supra note 22; see also KURZWEIL, supra note 55; see also TEGMARK, supra
See generally Irving J. Good, Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, 6 AD31 (1966).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 22.
See TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 39.
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66
67
68
69
70
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The application of the LOAR to AI is evidence that a transition from narrow
AI to AGI and superintelligence may be much closer than commonly thought.71 For
now, the earliest estimate of AGI is 2029.72 Indeed, Ray Kurzweil argues that the
twenty-first century will yield what today may seem like 20,000 years of
technological progress and innovation because of the LOAR.73 Additionally,
Bostrom and AI theorist Eliezer Yudkowsky have predicted a public perception of
rapid kinetics in AI development due to anthropomorphism of AI.74
Anthropomorphism of AI refers to the ascription of human levels of intelligence to
non-human entities.75 Humans may consider a village idiot and Albert Einstein
extreme ends of the intelligence spectrum,76 yet the difference between the two on a
larger relative scale is actually de minimis.77 Thus, the advancement of an AI system
from the intelligence of the village idiot, to the intelligence of Einstein, to the
intelligence of AGI, and finally superintelligence may be faster than expected.78
Interestingly, these predictions are supported by the massive amount of
information humans began collecting at the dawn of the digital age.79 Indeed, the
amount of information humans collect is also accelerating.80 Data, defined as a
digital representation of information about the world,81 is created at an astounding
rate. Every two days, humans create more than five quintillion bytes of data, as much
data as they did from the dawn of civilization up until 2003.82
Harvard professor and economist Michael Kremer argues, “the fundamental
driver of human progress is not raw materials but technological solutions to
problems.”83 In the context of AI, data is the driving force behind technological
development instead of human programmers.84 And the driving force of
technological solutions is the realization that every piece of information can be
represented as numbers.85 The amount and type of data available for a particular
problem largely determines the strength of AI systems that can be developed.86 Thus,
the LOAR will have a profound impact on the development of AI toward AGI and
superintelligence.
Yet, some argue that AGI may never happen.87 For example, the late
Microsoft co-founder, Paul Allen asserts scientific progress is irregular and
hypothesizes that by the end of the twenty-first century, humans will have yet to

71 See id. at 157.
72 See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 261.
73 See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, in KURZWEIL NETWORK (2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns.
74 See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 85.
75 See Eliezer Yudkowsky, Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk,
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE RES. INST., 21 (2008), https://intelligence.org/files/AIPosNegFactor.pdf.
76 See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 85.
77 See Yudkowsky, supra note 75.
78 See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 86.
79 See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING 11 (2016).
80 See SUSSKIND, supra note 29 at 11.
81 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 3.
82 SUSSKIND, supra note 29, at 11.
83 Michael Kremer, “Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990,” 108 Q.
J. OF ECON. 3 (1993). (quoting SAIFEDEAN AMMOUS, THE BITCOIN STANDARD: THE DECENTRALIZED ALTERNATIVE TO CENTRAL BANKING (2018).
84 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 12.
85 Id.
86 SEBASTIAN RASCHKA & VAHID MIRJALILI, PYTHON MACHINE LEARNING, 2 (2d. ed. 2017).
87 Paul G. Allen & Mark Greaves, The Singularity Isn’t Near, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 12, 2011),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425733/paul-allen-the-singularity-isnt-near/.
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achieve AGI.88 On the other hand, Max Tegmark suggests that the fundamental truth
of the debate—whether humanity will ever build AGI—remains uncertain.89 But
Tegmark also explains that most AI experts project AGI will occur around 2047.90
As one scholar argues, the questions about AI’s impact will only become more urgent
as we draw nearer to the exponential inflection point and its growth takes a sudden
and dramatic vertical trajectory.91 For now, the question is whether society is
approaching that inflection point or if it is still in the slower gradual development
phase.92 Today, the clearest path that humanity has toward creating AGI is deep
reinforcement learning.
II. AGI DEVELOPMENT
Machine learning is a subfield of AI that focuses on the ability of machines to learn
and replicate cognitive behaviors associated with the human mind.93 Generally,
machine learning involves data mining, pattern recognition, and natural-language
processing.94 These techniques have become increasingly popular in recent years
due to the explosion in the amount of data humans have produced and collected since
the dawn of the internet.95 The most recent breakthrough in machine learning is deep
reinforcement learning.96 Deep reinforcement learning combines two traditional
models of machine learning—supervised learning and reinforcement learning—to
allow algorithms to learn independently from humans.97
Most scholarship in AI regulation focuses on either supervised or
unsupervised methods of machine learning because until 2014, those were the only
two types of machine learning in popular use.98 Indeed, deep neural networks, a type
of supervised learning algorithm, are the focus of most legal scholarship.99 However,
in 2013, Google developed a new type of learning called “deep reinforcement
learning,” which it subsequently patented.100 Pioneered in the 1980s, reinforcement
learning is a machine learning technique inspired by behaviorist psychology, where
an intelligent agent’s tendency to act in a certain way is influenced by a reward
structure.101 An intelligent agent is an entity that collects information about its
environment from sensors and then processes that information to decide how to
respond to its environment.102 Deep reinforcement learning combines reinforcement
88 Id.
89 TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 54.
90 Id. at 157.
91 Michael Guihot et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 400 (2017).
92 See id.
93 See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 79.
94 See Michael Simon et al., Lola v. Skadden and the Automation of the Legal Profession, 20 YALE J.L.
& TECH 234, 253 (2018) (quoting Bernard Marr, What Everyone Should Know About Cognitive Computing,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016, 3:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/03/23/what-everyone-should-know-about-cognitive-computing/#5630f9005088.
95 See id. at 252.
96 See TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 85.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 83.
99 See generally Calo, supra note 6; see also John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1253 (2010).
100 ’862 Application, supra note 15.
101 RICHARD S. SUTTON & ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: AN INTRODUCTION 55
(2017); see also TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 85.
102 TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 84.
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learning with the use of deep neural networks.103 Deep reinforcement learning refers
to a reinforcement-learning algorithm using a deep neural network as a function
approximator, which will be explained later in this Part.104 First, this Part will explain
deep neural networks. Second, this Part will explain reinforcement learning. Third,
this Part will explain deep reinforcement learning.
A. DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS
The human brain is composed of processing units called “neurons.”105 Each
neuron in the brain is connected to other neurons through structures called
synapses.106 A biological neuron consists of dendrites—receivers of various
electrical impulses from other neurons—that are gathered in the cell body of a
neuron.107 Once the neuron’s cell body has collected enough electrical energy to
exceed a threshold amount, the neuron transmits an electrical charge to other neurons
in the brain through synapses.108 This transfer of information in the biological brain
provides the foundation for the way in which modern neural networks operate.109
Indeed, artificial neurons are essentially logic gates modeled off of the
biological neuron.110 Both artificial and biological neurons receive input from
various sources and map input information to a single output value.111 An artificial
neural network is a group of interconnected artificial neurons capable of influencing
each other’s behavior.112 In an artificial neural network, the neurons are connected
by weight coefficients modeling the strength of synapses in the biological brain.113
Neural networks are trained using large data sets.114 The training process allows the
weight coefficients to adjust so that the neural network’s output or prediction is
accurate.115 After a neural network is trained, new data is fed through the network to
make predictions.116
In 1957, Frank Rosenblatt published an algorithm—the perceptron—that
automatically learns the optimal weight coefficients for an artificial neural
network.117 The perceptron model is illustrated below:118

103 Fei-Fei Li, Justin Johnson, & Serena Yeung, Lecture 14: Deep Reinforcement Learning, STANFORD
U. SCH. OF ENG’G (2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvoHnicueoE (last accessed May 13, 2019).
104 Id.
105 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 86.
106 Id.
107 RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18.
108 Id.
109 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 86.
110 KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 38.
111 JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 131 (2018).
112 TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 72.
113 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 88.
114 Id. at 89.
115 Id.
116 KELLEHER, supra note 111, at 127.
117 RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18.
118 Id.
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In the perceptron, the three circles on the far left represent the input values 𝑥𝑗…𝑚 and
the associated weight values 𝑤𝑗…𝑚 are the three circles to the right of the input
values.119 The input values and the weight values are aggregated, typically with a
summation equation represented by the first big circle (from left to right).120 The
second large circle represents the threshold function, a predetermined value that, if
exceeded, signals an output of 1.121 If the threshold function is not exceeded, the
model outputs a 0.122 The output is represented by the arrow pointing right.123 The
box at the top of the model represents an error function.124 In the event that the
model’s output is incorrect, then the error function is triggered.125 If the error
function is triggered, the weight values are updated pursuant to the perceptron
learning rule.126 The formal representation of the perceptron learning rule is defined
(𝑖)
as: ∆𝑤𝑗 = 𝜂(𝑦 (𝑖) − 𝑦̂ 𝑖 )𝑥𝑗 , where 𝜂 is the learning rate, 𝑦 (𝑖) is the true class label of
the ith training sample, and 𝑦̂ 𝑖 is the predicted class label.127 The true class label is
the output label, and the predicted class label is the perceptron’s output.128
Every neural network has an input layer and an output layer.129 However, in
between the input and output layer, neural networks contain multiple hidden
layers.130 The number of hidden layers may vary and is dependent on the particular
model.131 It is important to note that while perceptron models are generally limited
to linear classification tasks, this restriction does not apply to multi-layer networks.132
Indeed, a multi-layer perceptron model is a universal approximator, which is an
algorithm that can approximate any function with desired accuracy given enough
neurons.133 A deep neural network is a network that has multiple hidden layers. 134
This allows the neural network to account for several layers of abstraction.135 The
illustration below is a simple model of a deep neural network.136
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 19.
See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 89.
See Id.
See RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18.
See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 132.
See RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18.
See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 90.
See id.
See RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 21.
See id. at 22.
See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 132.
See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 100.
See KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 111, at 132.
See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 99.
See id.
See TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 76.
ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 88.
KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 111, at 132 (model based on illustration at the following citation).
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Each neuron represents a hidden unit in a layer and defines a complex feature of the
model.137 Hidden units correspond to hidden attributes defined in terms of what is
observed, but not directly observed.138 And the successive layers of hidden units
correspond to increasing layers of feature abstraction.139
Indeed, each layer of hidden units acts as a feature extractor by providing
analysis of slightly more complicated features.140 Feature extraction is a method of
dimensionality reduction—a method of decreasing input attributes—that allows raw
input to be converted into output in a manner that allows data scientists to observe
hidden features in data.141 The later hidden units extract hidden features by
combining the previous features in a slightly larger part of the input space.142 The
output layer observes the whole input to produce a final prediction.143 In other words,
deep neural networks learn more complicated functions of their initial input when
each hidden layer combines the values of the preceding layer.144 Additionally, deep
neural networks have proven to be excellent for making predictions in several
contexts.145 However, these models require data to learn and at least a minimal
amount of human intervention to supervise the learning process.146 Reinforcement
learning is a newer machine learning technique that requires neither.147
B. DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Reinforcement learning is a type of machine learning technique inspired by
behaviorist psychology.148 Formally, reinforcement learning is described through an
agent-environment interaction, with the Markov Decision Process (“MDP”).149 The
model below describes the agent-environment interaction in an MDP.150

137 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 100.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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144 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 104.
145 See generally ASHLEY, supra note 31.
146 ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 106.
147 Id. at 127.
148 SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 101, at 38.
149 Alex Kendall et al., Learning to Drive in a Day, 1 (Sept. 11, 2018) (unpublished paper) (accessed
through https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00412).
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The environment is made up of states for each point in time in which the environment
exists.151 The agent’s actions in each state determine the probabilistic evolution of
the environment.152
Initially, the agent is presented with a state of the environment, which
includes several possible actions.153 Then, the agent takes an action in the state and
advances to the next state of the environment, where a reward is returned.154 The
agent chooses which action to take when presented with a state based upon the
agent’s policy.155 A policy is the way in which an agent makes decisions or chooses
actions within a state.156 For example, a person with a high amount of integrity has
a policy that routinely guides their decision making to choose to do the right thing
when faced with ethical dilemmas. Similarly, a greedy person has a policy that
routinely guides their decision making to choose the action returning the highest
dollar value. The goal of the policy is to allow the agent to advance through the
environment so as to maximize a reward.157
A value-function defines the value of being in a state s and following a policy
𝜋 until the final state of the environment, which is called the terminal state.158 The
terminal state concludes the episode, which is made up of all of the states in an
environment.159 The expected value of executing a policy 𝜋 given state s is denoted
as 𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠). 160 In the context of a MDP, the value function 𝑉 𝜋 is equal to the expected
sum of the discounted rewards for executing policy 𝜋:161
𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠) = E[𝑅(𝑠0 ) + 𝛾𝑅(𝑠1 ) + ⋯ |𝑠0 = 𝑠, 𝜋(𝑠)]
The expected future rewards are discounted with a discount factor 𝛾.162 The discount
factor is typically defined: 0 < 𝛾 < 1.163 This allows the value function to be defined
151 Li, Johnson, & Yeung, supra note 103.
152 MYKEL J. KOCHENDERFER, DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 77 (2015).
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154 KOCHENDERFER, supra note 152, at 77; see also SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 101, at 39.
155 SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 101, at 39.
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2017), (unpublished paper) (accessed at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.02532.pdf. See Appendix A for Summary of
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in finite terms and allows the value of present rewards to be more valuable than future
rewards.164 The optimal policy 𝜋 ∗ (𝑠) is defined as the policy that maximizes the
expected value relative to other policies.165 The objective of the MDP model is to
find the optimal policy:166
𝜋 ∗ (𝑠) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max 𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠)
𝜋

The problem of finding the optimal policy for a given MDP is commonly
solved with Q-learning.167 Q-learning solves this problem by maximizing a Q-value
function: Q(𝑠, 𝑎).168 A Q-value function describes the value of a state-action pair.169
Indeed, the goal of a Q-learning algorithm is to discover the optimal Q-value function
𝑄 ∗ for any state-action pair.170 The Bellman equation expresses the relationship
between the value of a state and the values of its successor states.171 The algorithm
continues perpetually until the convergence of the Q-value function.172 The
convergence of the Q-value function represents 𝑄 ∗ and satisfies the Bellman
Equation, defined as:173
𝑄 ∗(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝔼𝑠′ ~𝜀 [𝑟 + 𝛾 max
𝑄 ∗ (𝑠 ′ , 𝑎′ )|𝑠, 𝑎]
′
𝑎

An agent’s optimal policy 𝜋 ∗ corresponds to taking the action in each state defined
by 𝑄 ∗.174 However, one issue that arises is that the value of 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) must be computed
for every state-action pair, which may be computationally infeasible.175 For example,
computing the value of every state-action pair, where the raw input is pixels in an
Atari game, would require tremendous computational power.176 One solution is to
use a function approximator to estimate the Q-value function:177
𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; ∅) ≈ (𝑠, 𝑎)
Here, ∅ represents the function parameters.178 And if ∅ is determined by a Deep
Neural Network, the algorithm is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm called a
Deep Q-Network (“DQN”).179
A DQN is a deep learning model that combines a Deep Neural Network
(“DNN”) with a Q-learning algorithm.180 The DQN uses experience replay to
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165 See id. at 79.
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Drivers, at 26 (academic year 2016–17) (unpublished C.S. thesis, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
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maintain a buffer of old experiences of the algorithm to train a neural network.181 An
experience consists of an observed state-action pair, the immediate reward obtained,
and the next state observed.182 “An agent’s experience at a time step t is denoted et
and is a tuple (st, at, rt, st+1) consisting of the current state st, the chosen action at, the
reward rt, and the next state st+1.”183 The experiences for all the time steps are stored
in a replay memory, over many episodes, and are used to train the DNN.184 The
DNN’s output corresponds to one valid action because the DNN serves as an
approximator for the Q-value function.185 Thus, after a feedforward pass of the
network, the outputs are the estimated Q-values of the state-action pair.186 This
allows the algorithm to generalize from collected data of past experiences.187 Indeed,
according to MIT Professor Max Tegmark, “deep reinforcement learning is a
completely general technique.”188
III. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATION
Legal scholarship on the threat of AI is divided into two distinct camps. 189
One camp recognizes the potential threats posed by malicious and reckless use of AI,
and the other argues an AI apocalypse is merely the talk of science fiction.190 Neither
of these camps truly grapple with the existential threats AI poses with the sense of
immediacy required to prevent disaster.191 First, this Part will discuss the arguments
associated with the notion that AI poses no threat to humanity. Next, this Part will
discuss arguments that have advanced scholarship in AI regulation to mirror the
concerns of industry leaders. Lastly, this Part will address three ongoing and
unanswered questions in AI regulation.
Scholars who argue an AI apocalypse is merely science fiction are wrong.192
These scholars are represented by one in particular—John McGinnis—who notes,
“the existential dread of machines that become uncontrollable by humans and the
political anxiety about machines’ destructive power on a revolutionized battlefield”
are overblown.193 Indeed, McGinnis attributes the problems associated with AGI to
an error in thinking, where humans anthropomorphize AI and cause the mistaken fear
that AGI will necessarily reflect human malevolence.194 Thus, McGinnis suggests
the possibility of friendly AI and encourages disposing of the assumption that AI

181 HADO VAN HASSELT, ARTHUR GUEZ, & DAVID SILVER, ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING WITH DOUBLE Q-LEARNING 2094, 2095 (2016).
182 Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement Learning, 518 NATURE
INT’L J. SCI. 529, 529 (2015).
183 Legrand, supra note 180, at 72. A “tuple” is a data storage format similar to list or an array. Id. at
9.
184 VAN HASSELT, GUEZ, & SILVER, supra note 181.
185 Legrand, supra note 180, at 27.
186 Mnih et al., supra note 182.
187 KOCHENDERFER, supra note 152, at 124.
188 TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 85.
189 See Calo, supra note 6, at 432; see also Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353 (2016).
190 See generally McGinnis, supra note 99; see also Scherer, supra note 189, at 394.
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must have willpower like a human.195 He supposes that a lack of willpower should
negate the fear surrounding evil AI.196
Interestingly, the anthropomorphic argument cuts both ways. In fact, Nick
Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky have convincingly made the anthropomorphic
argument to explain why human beings will drastically underestimate the
advancement of AI.197 Bostrom and Yudkowsky argue that there will be a public
perception of rapid kinetics in AI development due to human anthropomorphism of
AI.198 Again, human anthropomorphism of AI refers to the ascription of human
levels of intelligence to non-human entities.199 As illustrated by the comparison in
Part I of Einstein and the village idiot, the difference between levels of intelligence
on a larger relative scale is de minimis.200 Thus, the advancement of AI to AGI and
superintelligence, will be faster than expected because the difference in the two levels
of intelligence on a broader scale is much narrower than humans realize.201
A second legal scholar, Ryan Calo, more bluntly argues that AI does not
present an existential threat to humanity and that AGI is merely the “stuff of graphic
novels.”202 Further, Calo contends that “devoting disproportionate attention and
resources to the AI apocalypse has the potential to distract policymakers from
addressing AI’s more immediate harms. . . .”203 He argues nothing in the field of
machine learning suggests that humanity will soon be capable of modeling
mammalian, let alone human intelligence.204 This claim is patently misguided.
Indeed, reinforcement learning and Markov Decision Processes quite literally model
the human cognitive functions of decision making, rational agency, and
intelligence.205 Additionally, exponential increases in data production, computing
power, and global GDP all lend support to the conclusion that AGI will arrive sooner
than humans think.206
Therefore, the existential threat that AGI poses to mankind is an immediate
harm. This threat is not analogous to a terminator-like robot taking over the world.
Instead, this threat is the product of AGI developed from deep reinforcement learning
agents.207 Once AGI level agents are created, they will rapidly have the ability to
improve their software architecture more efficiently than any human. These agents
will be capable of accomplishing any goal correlated with a reward system in a virtual
environment. Deep reinforcement learning systems are already capable of
controlling missiles, rockets, cars, and aircraft.208 And, the software for these
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applications is open sourced.209 So, today everyone with internet access also has
potential access to the most sophisticated weapons control systems on the planet.210
And yet, legal scholarship completely ignores this unavoidable truth. But,
some legal scholars have taken steps in the right direction without specifically
addressing the issue of regulating AGI. For example, Matthew Scherer argues the
starting point for regulating AI should be a statute establishing the general principles
of AI regulation.211 He proposes the Artificial Intelligence Development Act
(“AIDA”), which would create an agency tasked with certifying the safety of AI
systems.212 The agency would be required to promulgate rules defining AI.213 The
main idea is that AIDA would delegate the substantive task of assessing the safety of
AI systems to an independent agency staffed by specialists, thus insulating decisions
about the safety of specific AI systems from the pressures exerted by electoral
politics.214
Other scholarship discusses different regulatory frameworks that can be
applied to analyze issues in AI as they arise, as well as a few concrete examples of
problems in AI regulation.215 The piece convincingly argues that AI, “no matter its
potential, should be carefully handled.”216 Its authors advocate for a nuanced,
responsive, and adaptive regulatory framework to foster innovation.217 While limited
progress has been made in the field of AI regulation, the rapid growth of research in
intelligent-machine ethics and safety has not brought real progress.218 As one piece
notes, “[t]he great majority of published papers do little more than argue about which
of the existing schools of ethics, built over centuries to answer the needs of human
society, would be the right one to implement in our artificial progeny.” 219 Further,
even the more progressive scholarship in this field focuses quasi-exclusively on
narrow AI rather than AGI.220 Thus, none of the regulatory frameworks proposed by
scholars have adequately addressed several important issues in the AGI development.
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A. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN AGI DEVELOPMENT
Experts suspect cyber-attackers will soon begin implementing strategies that use
deep reinforcement learning agents to craft attacks that current technical defense
systems are incapable of preventing.221 Indeed, one scholar specifically details
guidelines for the development of malicious AI software.222 The scholarship was
written to demonstrate that it is practically possible to develop machine learning
algorithms that are capable of harming humans.223 Additionally, humans today
already have the power to destroy life on planet Earth with the use of nuclear
weapons, and an AGI would certainly have the same capability.224 Modern AI
scholars analogize the process of building AGI, specifically deep reinforcement
agents, to the building of nuclear weapons.225 This Part proceeds by identifying three
specific issues that any adequate regulatory framework for AI would need to
accommodate.
The first issue is the competition problem. If regulators attempt to provide
oversight to companies developing AGI, then this oversight will stifle innovation and
will allow countries like China and Russia to develop AGI before the United
States.226 Indeed, there is a strong possibility that any entity that creates AGI will
have a decisive advantage over the rest of the world.227
For example, DQN algorithms are commonly used to trade stocks, where an
agent is able to take the actions of buying, selling, or holding a stock in each given
state.228 The agent’s goal is to maximize the value of a portfolio.229 The use of DQN
algorithms for portfolio management has been successful.230 If an entity could create
AGI, then it could be used to create an agent capable of manipulating markets in a
way that would allow a single actor to garner extraordinary amounts of wealth over
a minimal period of time.231 This would allow such an entity to evolve to become a
unified central power of authority unbeknownst to the masses.232
The competition problem becomes even more daunting considering the
major players in AI today are publicly traded companies. Companies like Google,
Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are some of the biggest players in AI development,
and their technology is rapidly increasing in power and scalability.233 The power
disparity between these corporate actors, foreign governments, and the United States
poses further problems for regulators.234 If the federal government begins regulating
AI, it must be wary that slowing the pace of progress domestically will surely put the
United States at a disadvantage against foreign actors. The ultimate issue of the
221 BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 34; see also HYRUM S. ANDERSON, ET AL., LEARNING TO
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competition problem is that regulators are faced with a balancing of interests between
security and freedom. If regulators place a heavier emphasis on security, they do so
at the expense of the freedom that has allowed domestic industry leaders in
technology to innovate. On the other hand, if regulators place a heavier emphasis on
freedom, they do so at the expense of the security of the electorate. Therefore,
regulators must design a framework that is sensitive to the competition between
corporations, foreign governments, and national-security agencies.
The second issue regulators face is the “lone-wolf” concept in which a threat
is viewed as an isolated incident as opposed to a broad societal issue. In many ways,
regulating AI is analogous to the regulation of mathematics or computer science.
Indeed, AI research requires only a personal computer.235 Interestingly, scholars are
torn as to the size of a potential project to develop AGI.236 One scholar notes that the
path to AGI could be achieved as part of a massive government project from the work
of a small group or even the work of single individual.237 The scale of the path to
AGI in large part depends on the methods used to achieve AI.238 For example, if the
current methods of whole-brain emulation are employed it is likely that massive
amounts of code will need to be developed by expert computer scientists and
engineers to develop AGI.239 It is important to note that while a project itself may be
massive in scale, the individual group tasked with making the breakthrough from AI
to AGI may be very small.240 For example, the Manhattan Project employed roughly
130,000 people at its peak.241 Yet the atomic bomb was created by a smaller group
of scientists and engineers, led by J. Robert Oppenheimer and General Leslie Groves
at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.242
Another issue of the lone-wolf problem will manifest if the field of AI experiences a
breakthrough by a single individual. In which case, it is possible that everything we
currently know about AI could fall by the wayside. Science is no stranger to simple
yet revolutionary breakthroughs that radically alter the way in which humankind
understands the natural world.243 Yet, one scholar argues it is likely that regulatory
bodies could be aware of most people potentially capable of developing AGI.244
Although it should be noted that an epiphany in AI, like that of Einstein’s in physics
expressed in the Annus Mirabilis papers, should not be ruled out of the realm of
possibility. Therefore, it is possible that a single individual could be the first to create
AGI and could shortly thereafter attain an unprecedented degree of power.245
Regulators will need to design a framework that allows for the implementation of
technology to identify and prevent lone-wolf AGI attacks and threats.
The third issue technology regulators face is the control problem. The control
problem can be analyzed through a principal agent framework in two distinct ways.246
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The first framework exists where there is a project sponsor acting as a principal and
a group of scientists and engineers acting as agents of the project sponsor.247 In this
framework, the control problem manifests if the scientists and engineers developing
AGI use the knowledge and information they gain in the course of their work for
malicious purposes.248 For example, as a result of their respective companies’ AI
development, researchers at Apple, Google, and Facebook have gained immense
power249 and the capability of developing or altering advanced AI systems for their
own personal gain or to the detriment of others.
In the second framework, the principal is the human creator and the agent is the AI
system.250 In this framework, the control problem manifests if an AGI system is
developed and its actions are uncontrollable by its creator.251 Several different
methods of containing AGI have been presented. For example, Nick Bostrom has
proposed boxing methods to subdivide and contain AGI’s access to information.252
Additionally, Max Tegmark has suggested the creation of a “Gatekeeper AI,” a
superintelligence with the goal of interfering as little as necessary to prevent the
creation of another superintelligence, is possible.253 Therefore, regulators will need
to design a framework that controls the way in which AI researchers use their power
and a framework which allows for the regulation of AGI systems, so they can be
controlled by human actors.
In sum, three major problems faced by AI regulators are competition, the
lone-wolf concept, and control. One practical way in which these problems may be
addressed practically is with self-regulating AGI technology.254 In essence, this will
require the programming of AGI values in alignment with the values of the AGI’s
creator.255 One major benefit of this solution is that it allows for public regulators to
stay relatively in the dark regarding how AI technology works.256 However, there
are two major outstanding issues with this solution. First, if there is an AGI system
capable of regulating all other AI systems, there will need to be a regulatory
mechanism to contain the regulatory AGI so that it does not become a unified power
with control over humans. Second, humanity must ensure that the regulatory AGI is
not outmatched or overpowered by any other AI or AGI. Indeed, if there was an AGI
capable of improving itself, the abilities of any human programmer would be swiftly
left far behind, while Irving J. Good’s infamous words, “…the last invention that man
need ever make…” will echo in prophetic nature.257
CONCLUSION
There is a spectrum of possibility laid out in scholarship. On one end are
those who argue that AI will forever change human life in the near future, and on the
other are those who argue an AI apocalypse is merely science fiction. The truth is
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that neither camp fully understands AGI or the impacts it could have on our world.258
At the time of his death in 1988, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman’s
blackboard contained the words “[w]hat I cannot create, I do not understand.”259 It
follows that until mankind creates AGI, it is beyond the comprehension of mankind.
This reality poses an ironic fate for humankind. Indeed, humanity must first
understand AGI to control it, yet humans cannot understand AGI until it is created.
Further, according to Max Tegmark, “we have no idea what will happen if humanity
succeeds in building human-level AG.”260 Thus, we cannot take for granted that the
outcome will be positive if AGI is created.261 Indeed, the general consensus in the
field of AI is that no set of rules is capable of controlling the totality of what AGI
regulation requires.262 But no matter how many patterns can be recognized and trends
can be traced, the future of AI will not happen on its own.263
Most people think that the past has a deterministic relationship with the
future, but the truth is that the future is fundamentally uncertain.264 Since the early
twentieth century, humanity has possessed conclusive evidence that the entirety of
the space-time that humans perceive in their everyday experience only exists relative
to an individual’s subjective observation.265 And, in quantum physics, as well as at
the center of black holes, the laws of classical physics and the laws of space-time
breakdown completely.266 This is important because without space-time at a
fundamental level of existence, the independence of massive particles evaporates and
the forward flow of time humans perceive ceases to exist.267 This is evidenced by
the principles of superposition, non-locality, time-symmetry, and quantum
entanglement.268 Indeed, the future, as well as the past, exists in a fundamental state
of quantum uncertainty. AI is the key to maximizing the probability of prosperity in
the face of such uncertainty. Thus, we need to immediately work to create a safe and
prosperous future.269
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Appendix A
Summary of Notation
Meaning270

Notation
𝑄 ∗ (𝑠, 𝑎)
𝛾
𝔼[𝑥]
𝑎𝑟𝑔 max 𝑓(𝑎)

Value of taking action a under the
optimal policy
Discount factor
Expectation of random variable

𝑎

A value of a, at which 𝑓(𝑎) takes its
maximal value.

𝑟

Reward

𝑠𝑡

State at time t

𝜋

Policy

𝜋∗

Optimal policy

𝑉 𝜋 (𝑠)

Expected value of executing policy
from a given state.

270 See generally SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 101.

